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NOTES
Federal Civil Procedure
THE APPEALABITy OF INTERLOCUTORY ORUEms: 28 UNItED STATES
CODE § 1292.
Introduction
What is an appealable interlocutory order in the federal courts?
Attempts to resolve this question have led to considerable litiga-
tion and numerous contrary opinions have been spawned. The
substantive law involved is section 1292 of the United States Code,
Title 28, Judiciary & Judicial Procedure 3, providing for appeals of
interlocutory orders. The procedural difficulty is centered upon
the interpretation of rule 54 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which outlines the necessary requirements for an appeal
before final order. The split lies in the determination of what actu-
ally constitutes an interlocutory order that is appealable and has
manifested itself in a conflict among the various federal courts of
appeal as to the interpretation of section 1292.
Section 1292 provides for exceptions to the general rule stated
in section 12912, Final Decisions of District Courts, that appeals
may be had only from final judgments.3 Four exceptions are al-
1 28 US.C. § 1292 (1952). "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdic-
tion of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States,
the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, the United States District
Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to
dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had
in the Supreme Court;
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders
to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes
thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property;
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges
thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty
cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed;
(4) Judgments in civil actions for patent infringement which are
final except for accounting."
2 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1952). "The courts of appeals shall have jiarisdic-
tion of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States, the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, the United District
Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be
had in the Supreme Court"
3 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. I.R. v. Southern Express Co., 108
U.S. 24, 28 (1883).
19561
NOTRE DAME LAWYER[
lowed by section 1292: (1) injunctions; (2) receiverships; (3)
admiralty cases; and (4) patent infringements. The. principle un-
derlying these few exceptions is the prevention of irreparable
damages to the rights of the parties.4 The major area of diversifi-
cation lies in the first exception-injunctions. The courts of ap-
peals are in utter disagreement as to what motions constitute the
granting or refusing of an injunction. The problem area is fo-
cused in the opinions of the Second and Third Circuits and is
even more closely magnified by the split in the Second Circuit
itself.5 The conflict is spotlighted by the controversy over whether
a denial of a summary judgment is a denial of an injunction and
thus a final order appealable under section 1292 (1). The Second
Circuit permits the appeal;6 the Third Circuit refuses it.'
The arguments on both sides are telling. The Third Circuit is
supported by the greater number of other circuits and has a firm
entrenchment in history. The proponents of the Third Circuit pre-
sent the often used arguments of the evil of piecemeal appeals,"
undue delay,9 and the heavy costs incident to many appeals.' 0
Finally, the advocates of no review point to the already overbur-
dened court calendars." On the other side, the equity cry of ir-
reparable damages is most frequently used as the basis for the
Second Circuit's view of allowing appeal.'2
Development of Interlocutory Appeal
The Federal Judiciary Act of 17891a provided for appeals from
final judgments or decrees only. This limitation applied to ap-
4 Albert v. School District of Pittsburgh, 181 F2d 690 (3d Cir. 1950).
* Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 F.2d 295, 297-298 (7th Cir.
1955).
6 Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 217 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1954).
*l Morgenstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Corp., 181 F.2d 160 (3d Cir.
1950).
8 Coskery v. Roberts & Mander Corp., 189 F.2d 234, 236 (3d Cir. 1951).
* Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945).
10 Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 217 F.2d 936, 940 (2d Cir. 1954) (dis-
senting opinion).
I' "Trials ought not to be delayed and appellate dockets crowded by
appeals from interlocutory orders . M." organtown v. Royal Ins. Co.,
169 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1948).
12 ". . . the property of defendant could be seized and sold in satisfac-
tion. Defendant's right of review ... would be of doubtful value." Biggins
v. Oltmer Iron Works, 154 F.2d 214, 217-218 (7th Cir. 1946).
13 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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peals from the highest state courts to the Supreme Court; from
district courts to circuit courts; and by implication from circuit
courts to the Supreme Court.'4 The provision for interlocutory
appeal was first introduced in 1891 when the circuit courts of
appeal were established as intermediate appellate courts.' 5 Sec-
tion 7 of the 1891 Act allowed appeals from interlocutory orders
in equity "granting or continuing" injunctions, but from these
only. In 1895, section 7 was amended to permit an appeal from
interlocutory orders refusing or dissolving injunctions.' " A fur-
ther amendment was made in 1900 to include orders in receiver-
ship. 17 This amendment had the effect of repealing the 1895 pro-
vision. However, the latter section was restored in section 129 of
the Judicial Code of 1911.38
The amendment of 192519 made two changes. First, it embraced
orders modifying injunctions and expanded the number of or-
ders in receivership which were appealable. Second, it dropped
the words "in equity" from the phrase, "where upon a hearing
in equity in a district court.. ." which had been employed since
the original enactment of section 7 in 1891. No change was in-
tended by the omission.20 In 1927, provision was made for inter-
locutory appeals in patent cases which are final save for account-
ing.21 (Interlocutory appeals in bankruptcy cases are covered by
section 24 of the Bankruptcy Act.) 22 Finally, on June 25, 1948,
the present section 1292 was passed.s
This lengthy and active history of interlocutory appeals indi-
cates an ever present awareness of Congress that to shut the door
completely to appeal prior to final judgments would result in
serious irreparable consequences. Whenever the pressure for
change rose to such a point that Congress was influenced, legis-
lative remedies followed. Congress is in a position to weigh the
competing interests of the dockets of the trial and appellate
courts, to consider the practicality of savings in time and ex-
'4 Id. at 85, 84 and 80 (§§ 25, 22, and 13 respectively).
3Z 26 STAT. 828 (1891).
16 28 STAT. 666 (1895).
17 31 STAT. 660 (1900). Rowan v. Ide, 107 Fed. 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1901);
Columbia Wire Co. v. Boyce, 104 Fed. 172 (7th Cir. 1900).
18 36 STAT. 1134 (1911). See FRANxrmTER AN mLANDis, Tim Busmass
or T=E Sumr'mE CoURT 126-127 (1927).
'9 43 STAT. 937 (1925).
20 Hildegard Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg American Line, 294 U.S.
454, 457 (1935).
21 44 STAT. 1261 (1927).
22 30 STAT. 553 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 47 (1952).
23 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952).
19561
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
pense, and to give proper weight to the effect on litigants.24
Congress has shown a propensity to broaden the right of appeal
and it would seem that now again Congress might act. Either
Congress should open the door further or take a firm stand against
additional appeals.
The history of judicial appeals extends far into the past. The
Roman Law, after an early period during which it granted no re-
lief from the decisions of the magistrate, set up a complicated
system of appeals. This proved to be burdensome and was sub-
sequently reformed so that no appeals were allowed from inter-
locutory orders.25 Early England knew no appeal for it was de-
cided that the king's court could not be charged with a false
judgment, and the only means for correcting errors in common
law courts was by a writ of error.26 These common law decisions
involving writs of error are clearly the origin of our rule that
only final judgments are appealable.27 This rigid rule of the com-
mon law was not known to the equity courts as is indicated by
the Judicature Act of 1925.28
Morgenstern v. Federal Glass Co.
The cases in this country fail to show any unanimity upon what
interlocutory orders are appealable. In the federal circuits, the
majority of the courts maintain that unless an order is clearly
final, it will not be appealable. The Third Circuit, the leading
advocate of this doctrine, decided in Morgenstern Chemical Co.
v. Schering Corp.,29 that a denial of a summary judgment was not
a final order and therefore not appealable. The plaintiff brought
suit against the defendant for an alleged infringement of his
registered trade-mark. Plaintiff's motion for a summary judg-
ment was denied by the district court. An appeal was taken to
the Third Circuit and there it was urged that the denial of a
24 DIRECTOR OF THE ADmiNISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 27(1953). See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1344 (1953).
25 ENGELMANN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (Continental
Legal History Series) 367-368 (1927).
26 2 POLLOCH & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 666 (2d ed. 1952).
See Note, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1955).
27 See McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665 (1891).
28 The Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 &
16 GEO. 5, c. 49. See, 4 HALSBURY, COMPLETE STATUTES OF ENGLAND, 146,
162 (1929).
29 181 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1950).
[Vol. XXXI
NOTES
motion for summary judgment which, if granted, would have re-
sulted in an injunction, came under the exceptions to the final
judgment rule as set out in section 1292 (1).30 The petitioner
stated in effect that he was denied an injunction. The Third Cir-
cuit ruled that a denial of a motion for summary judgment was
not an appealable order when there were genuine issues of fact
present. In Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, Inc.,31 the Third Circuit
reaffirmed its position in the Morgenstern case when it denied a
motion for a permanent injunction that was based upon the grant-
ing of a partial summary judgment.
The Eighth Circuit has adopted the view of the Third Circuit
in holding that a denial of a motion for summary judgment is not
appealable for it is not a final order.32 The Ninth Circuit says
that a partial summary judgment is not a final judgment but
rather only a pre-trial order and could only be appealable if the
action threatens to dissipate the res of the controversy prior to
determination of all the issues in the district court.33 Thus the
Ninth Circuit will only allow appeal if by granting the motion,
the controversy is settled. They would seem not to consider pos-
sible irreparable damages. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit in
Kasishke v. Baker34 would allow appeal from a partial judgment
only if the result amounted to a final order. The United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals adds additional support to
the view that denial of a motion for summary judgment is not
an appealable order.33 Strangely enough the Patent Court cites
a 1949 Second Circuit court decision as authority for this po-
sition.36
The other side of this argument is centered in the Second Cir-
cuit, with support from the District of Columbia and occasionally
from the Fifth Circuit. The leading case in opposition to the
Morgenstern rule is the Federal Glass Co. v. LoshinS7 case in
which a denial of a motion for summary judgment was held to
be, in effect, a denial of an injunction and appealable under sec-
tion 1292 (1). The plaintiff had brought an action to enjoin the
defendant from copying the plaintiff's tradename and corporate
30 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952). See note 2 supra.
31 213 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1954).
32 Dutton v. Cities Service Defense Corp., 197 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1952).
33 Wynn v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 212 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1954).
31 144 F-2d 384 (10th Cir. 1944).
35 Master, Wardens, Etc. v. Sheffield Steel Corp., 41 C.C.P.A. (Pat-
ents) . . . , 215 F.2d 285 (1954).
36 Marcus Breier Sons, Inc. v. Marvlo Fabrics, Inc., 173 F-2d 29 (2d Cir.
1949).
37 217 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1954).
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title. The district court for the District of Connecticut denied a
motion of the petitioner for summary judgment. The petitioner
appealed and the respondent moved to dismiss the appeal. Judge
Learned Hand's opinion for the court argued that merely be-
cause summary judgment was denied because of a genuine is-
sue of fact, this does not justify holding that nothing has been
decided; this is no objection, for denial of preliminary injunctions
would also be excluded and the result would be a nullity of sec-
tion 1292 (1). Judge Hand saw the denial working an injustice
in that it may result in irreparable injury to the moving party.
Judge Frank concurred in this ruling while Chief Justice Clark
followed the reasoning in the Morgenstern case in his dissent.
The Second Circuit had earlier ruled on this same question in
Raylite Electric Corp. v. Noma Electric Corp.,38 reaching a simi-
lar decision, but its ruling was based on the concurrent denial
of an injunction.
The Fifth Circuit in hearing argument on denial of petitioner's
motion for judgment on the pleadings in the International For-
warding Co.39 case found no difficulty with the fact that the ap-
peal was there at all. The decision merely cited in a footnote to
section 1292 (1) and proceeded. The other circuits have not found
the matter quite so simple. It should be mentioned that the Fifth
Circuit has discussed the problem in other cases, reaching a dif-
ferent conclusion.
40
The Second Circuit also has interpreted rule 54 (b) in a man-
ner diametrically opposed to the Third Circuit. The Second Cir-
cuit, along with the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia,
held that the courts of appeal are required to make an inde-
pendent determination as to whether the order in question was,
in fact, a final order.34 Again, as in the summary judgment ques-
tion, the Second Circuit found itself internally split. In Pabellon
v. Grace Line, Inc.,42 Judge Clark wrote the opinion and held
that the district court judge had jurisdiction to decide appeala-
bility of orders. Judge Frank, in a concurring opinion, disagreed
in respect to this phase of the case. Eight days later, in Flegen-
heimer v. General Mills,4 3 the Second Circuit did an about face
and held that the circuit court should make an independent de-
termination, the majority of the court accepting Frank's reason-
38 170 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1948).
39 International Forwarding Co. v. Brewer, 181 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1950).
40 Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1939).
41 Flegenheiner v. General Mills, Inc., 191 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1951);
followed in Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 209 F.2d 802, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
42 191 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1951).Questioned in 218 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1955).
43 191 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1951).
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ing. Soon thereafter, Judge Clark vigorously defended his view
that had been -taken in the Pabellon: case.44 Again, Judge Frank
and Judge Clark were alligned on the opposite sides of the fence.
It is clear that their thinking in this matter is reflected in their
holdings on the appealability of summary judgments.
The First Circuit has sided with the Third Circuit in this po-
sition, but its stand would appear to involve a more fundamental
point. In Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Lea,45 the First Circuit
held that where an order has been entered by a district court
judge, he has made a determination and jurisdiction is automati-
cally and conclusively conferred upon the court of appeal to hear
the appeal. The effect of this reasoning is that where the district
court judge has not fulfilled the procedure laid out in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in rule 54 (b) ,46 the order is not final or
appealable. The Third Circuit two months earlier used this rea-
soning in their holding in the Bendix Aviation case. 47 The Seventh
Circuit, in Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,48 clearly laid the
problem out and then fell in line with the First and Third Cir-
cuits. It is interesting to note that the court, in the Mackey
opinion, called for an early Supreme Court ruling on this matter,
but as of this writing the Supreme Court had not done so.
Moore, in his Federal Practice, observes the dispute and states
that the Morgenstern case and the Third Circuit have the cor-
rect view.49 He believes that the Second Circuit in the Raylite
case "... . seems to have assumed that the denial of plaintiff's mo-
tion was appealable because it denied the claimant an injunction."
Moore is of the opinion that this is not the case and that a motion
for summary judgment is not an application for a preliminary in-
junction. The denial merely means that the case should go to
44 Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems, Inc., 194 F.2d 422, 424
(2d Cir. 1951) (concurring opinion).
45 195 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1952).
40 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). "Judgment Upon Multiple Claims. When more
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, the court may direct
the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the
rlaims only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims shall
not terminate the action as to any of the claims, and the order or other
form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claim."
47 Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 1951)
(dictum).
48 218 F.2d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1955).
49 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 2321-22 (1953).
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trial and the plaintiff is not precluded from seeking a temporary
injunction in accordance with equitable principles.50
The Supreme Court and Interlocutory Orders
The Supreme Court has seen the problem of appeal from in-
terlocutory orders but on a much broader scale than is in ques-
tion here. Starting with the Enelow case 5 ' in 1935, the Supreme
Court has recognized the denial of a legal action pending the
outcome of an equitable defense was in effect an injunction and
appealable. However, in 1938, with the merger of law and equity
in the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it was
held that the logical basis for the Enelow decision no longer ex-
isted.52 Yet, in 1942, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the theory
of the Enelow case, ruling in a similar situation that the district
judge's order to hear the equitable defense was first as effective as
an injunction issued by the chancellor.53
In January of 1955, the Supreme Court found considerable au-
thority for the refusal to grant appeals from orders other than
final orders and held that a refusal to stay an action for an ac-
counting is not the refusal of an injunction so as to permit ap-
peal.5 1 This lack of clarity in the Supreme Court has mirrored
itself throughout the federal districts.
The Federal Circuits
This confusion among the circuits extends beyond the appeala-
bility of a summary judgment motion and can be found wherever
an order is declared interlocutory and appealable. The cases
50 Ibid.
51 Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
52 Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563, 564-565
(2d Cir. 1942).
53 Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942); cf. Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). But see, Morgan-
town v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 258 (1949), where the Court refused to
extend the exception of appealability of stays at pretrial level to situations
where trial of a legal counterclaim is stayed pending determination of the
initial suit which is equitable in nature.
-5 Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955).
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manifest no common denominator for future decision.5 5 The Su-
preme Court said in Ettelsom v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.56 that
"the statute looks to the substantial effect of the order made,"
with regard to the rights affected rather than the mere form of
the order. It would seem that the courts of appeal have failed to
follow this standard. The circuits that have once ruled an order
final, hesitate to reverse themselves regarding the particular or-
der, with the result that the order controls rather than the sub-
stance of the right. The foregoing cases seem to indicate that the
test for section 1292 is the same as that used in the equity courts,
namely: whether the denial of the appeal is likely to result in ir-
reparable injury. The circuits are threatening to establish judi-
cial precedent for a particular order and are turning a deaf ear
to pleas that may make an interlocutory order appealable in one
case and not in another.
Proposals
In 1952, a proposal was made to incorporate into section 1292
an additional provision, the effect of which would open further
55 The treatment of interlocutory orders by the circuit courts of appeals
as to whether such orders are appealable or not has proven a confusing and,
indeed, a most perplexing situation. In Youpe v. Moses, 213 F.2d 613 (D.C.
Cir. 1954), the court held that the granting of a motion to quash service of
summons was not appealable where defendants were jointly liable with
twelve others who were properly served. The Fifth Circuit allowed an
appeal from a denial of a judgment on the pleadings. Int'l Forwarding Co.
v. Brewer, 181 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1950) (though the question of appealability
of the order was not presented to the court.). The Ninth Circuit in Chugach
Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Anchorage, 214 F.2d 110, 112n. (9th Cir. 1954), held ap-
pealable under Rule 54(b), note 38 supra, a judgment on one cause of action
where there were several causes. The Third Circuit in the same year held
that a dismissal of a complaint against one party is not appealable where
there is an existing suit against a second party named in the complaint
Shipley Corp. v. Leonard Marcus Co., 214 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1954). An order
to make proper conveyances within a specified time was held appealable,
Kasishke v. Baker, 144 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1944), while a directive order
was declared not a final order in Virgin Islands Bar Ass'n v. Dench, 215
F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1954). Finally, in perhaps the widest application of the
Third Circuit's position, the First Circuit in In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174
(1st Cir. 1954) held that an order to transfer a civil action from Mas-
sachusetts to New Mexico was not appealable as a final order nor one
of the exceptions under section 1292.
56 317 U.S. 188, 192 (1942).
57 DIRECTOR OF THE ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 203 (1952).
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the door to appeal before final order.57 However, the committee
rejected the proposal, stating, in the annual report of the Judicial
Conference of 1952, ".... an amendment to the Code in the form
proposed would unduly encourage fragmentary and frivolous
appeals with the evils and delays incident thereto . .. ,"58 It was,
however, further noted that proposals would be accepted the
following year. In 1953, the committee appointed to study pro-
posals to enlarge the scope of appeal from interlocutory orders of
the district court presented its report.5 9 The committee unani-
mously concluded that ". . . provision should be made for the
allowance of appeals from interlocutory orders in those excep-
tional cases where it is desirable that this be done to avoid
unnecessary delay and expenses. . . ." The Judicial Conference
in their annual report for 195360 approved the recommendation of
the committee but as of this writing no further action has been
taken. Under this proposal, limits could be set to preclude
groundless appeals and piecemeal litigation. The proposed amend-
ment would read as follows:
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order
not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the
opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law
as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so
state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may there-
upon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry
of the order; provided, however, that application for an appeal
hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless
the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof
shall so order.6 '
The committee gave as the controlling reason for the proposal,
"protracted and expensive litigation. '6 2 Final discretion would
lie with the courts of appeal who would not permit their dockets
to be crowded with piecemeal and minor litigation. It is submit-
ted that the proposed amendment merely permits the circuit
courts to hear an appeal if they so desire. Such an arrangement
would probably not alleviate the confusion that already exists.
Is it likely that circuit judges will hear appeals that prior to the
58 Ibid.
59 DIRECTOR OF THE ADAmIsTRATIvE OFFICE OF THM UNITED STATES COURTS,
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 27 (1953).
60 Id. at 28.
61 Id. at 27.
62 Ibid.
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proposed amendment they had refused to accept, merely be-
cause the law will permit them to do so, but does not command
them?
Conclusion
The answer to this maelstrom would seem to lie in more force-
ful legislation, or, as one court suggested, an early Supreme Court
ruling.63 The petitioner in the typical case argues for wider ap-
peal for prevention of injury while the litigation lumbers on to
adjudication. The plea is sound. If irreparable injury might en-
sue, the appeal should be heard immediately. But the argument
is made by the courts that the dockets are already crowded and
such a move would add immeasurably to the burden. Here again,
the plea is sound. If the refusal to the plea of irreparable injury
is based on crowded conditions, then, rather than the plea go un-
heard, the crowded conditions must be relieved. If additional
judges and emergency judicial teams, as proposed by the United
States Attorney General fail to relieve the congestion,6' then
further steps must be taken. Perhaps the answer lies with the
splitting of the federal circuit system and the creation of more
benches, giving the distressed litigants more courts to which an
appeal may be taken. If these steps are necessary for a resolution
of the problem, we should not hesitate through fear of change.
If the only means of serving justice is a complete revision of the
circuit system, the move should be undertaken. The circuit courts
were created to relieve crowded conditions.6 5 Such conditions
exist again.
Lawrence J. Dolan
63 The Seventh Circuit in the Mackey case, note 48 supra.
64 New York Times, Oct. 22, 1955, § 1, p. 1, col. 8.
65 MooRE, CoMInrRy ON =HE U.S. JUDICMiL CODE 37 (1949).
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